![]() To borrow a phrase, while all things may not be interrelated, at least in this case Alan's ability to obtain “sufficient financial resources to present case adequately” is interrelated with the trial court's pendente lite fee order (which allows his adversary to have a lawyer when he doesn't) and the error on the cost bill (which deprives him of a sum theoretically otherwise available for use as a retainer). His objective in filing these writ petitions is to scrape up sufficient money to retain counsel needed to present his case in the upcoming child support proceeding. Alan is one pro per litigant who has made it clear he does not want to be in pro per. Not under these particular circumstances. Now, one might ask, does not Alan have an adequate remedy at law? After all, both the pendente lite fee order and the order reducing appellate costs are each appealable. ![]() Since a post-appeal cost order is a money judgment, as distinct from an equitable order to pay money, the trial court had no power to unilaterally make that judgment payable in monthly installments. The trial court (incorrectly, as we show below) slashed some $6,000 in appellate costs that Alan had coming to him from a previous (unpublished) appellate proceeding to less than $3000, and further, also incorrectly, made the cost order payable in installments of $150. The second order involves a clear error of law on the rather esoteric (and under-written on) subject of post-appeal cost orders. Here, however, there are several significant relevant factors that the trial court did not consider, including Alan's negative cash flow of about $800 a month (he ran up a large credit card debt in order to pay a $25,000 attorney fee bill from the time when he was represented), the respective amounts of property owned by the parties (including some horses that Mary owns and apparently rents out and whether either of the parties has any equity in their respective homes), the $1,800 a month in child support that Alan pays to Mary as a result of the now reversed order, new mate or new partner contributions to the respective households (Mary has remarried, Alan lives with a non-marital partner with whom he recently had a child 4 ), and, finally, the incurrence by Mary of at least a quantum of fees clearly not “reasonably necessary” for the litigation to date. This order does not pass muster, even under an abuse of discretion standard of review, because, as pointed out in In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-871, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 (Keech ) as well as several other cases, the record must reflect that the court did in fact consider the factors set forth in sections 20. The first order is an attorney fee order against Alan and in favor of Mary for $9,000. On scrutiny, we have determined that neither of the challenged orders passes muster. We scheduled this OSC because, in other words, it appeared that the upcoming custody hearing will not be a fair fight with “each party” being able to present its case. The two challenged orders appear to assure that, while Mary is well represented by obviously able and diligent counsel, Alan will be left, like the pro per in Elkins, to haplessly flail away. (The upcoming hearing is a product of that reversal, since the trial court, as we explain anon, utilized the wrong standard to gauge whether there had been a change of circumstances.) Alan is already paying support for children that were taken away from him by way of a now reversed child custody order. More specifically, Alan challenges two orders made by the trial court preparatory to a child custody hearing brought by his ex-wife, Mary T., which have impacted his own ability to retain counsel. ![]() 5-75 (hereinafter Rutter Group Family Law Treatise). Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 5:180, p. (a)(1), italics added see also fam.code, § 2032, subd. The issue, generally framed, is how courts are to achieve, particularly in low and middle income cases, the legislative goal of assuring “each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party's rights.” (Fam.Code, § 2030, subd. We scheduled an OSC on father Alan S.'s writ petition challenging two pre-trial 1 orders implicating his ability to retain counsel, because his petition presents an important issue regarding access to justice for pro per 2 family law litigants. The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent Mary T., Real Party in Interest. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.ĪLAN S., JR., Petitioner, v. ![]()
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